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Abstract:  This paper examines the determinants of emission credit allocations under the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) —a program aimed at reducing nitrogen oxides (NOX) and sulfur oxides (SOX) – in 
the greater Los Angeles area. Our results suggest that deviations in the allocation of emission credits can be 
systematically explained by firm-level factors and the location of the facility. Our results also indicate that 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In October of 1993, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) of 
California adopted the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program, which set 
an emissions cap and declining balance for many of the largest facilities emitting nitrogen oxides 
(NOX) and sulfur oxides (SOX) in the south coast air basin. RECLAIM included 374 participants 
in its NOX market and 40 participants in its SOX market. Motivated by theoretical arguments and 
growing empirical evidence that market-based instruments are substantially more cost-effective 
than traditional command-and-control regulations, the program was designed to provide industry 
with the flexibility to decide how to reduce emissions and advance pollution control techniques 
(USEPA, 2002).1  
                                                 
*We are grateful for the useful comments and suggestions received from seminar participants at Camp Resources, the Western 
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1 Since the early 1970s, economists have advocated for the use of market-based policies, such as emissions taxes or tradable 
permits (Weitzman, 1974; Dales, 1968). Early work by Baumol and Oates (1971) and Montgomery (1972) demonstrated that 
market-based permit systems have the potential of minimizing the cost associated with attaining a target of emissions reductions. 
Additional studies include the work by Atkinson and Lewis (1974), Seskin et al. (1983), McGartland and Oates (1985), Hahn and 
Hester (1989), and Tietenberg (1990), which present empirical magnitudes for market-based permit systems relative to the 
command and control policies. More recently Fowlie et al. (2012) have analyzed the equity concerns of cap and trade programs, 
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At the beginning of the RECLAIM program, a key issue addressed by the SCAQMD was 
the definition of the rule that would allocate emission credits amongst different facilities 
(Johnson and Pekelney, 1996). NOX and SOX credit allocations were issued to RECLAIM 
facilities based on their historical activity levels and applicable emission control levels specified 
in the rules that the RECLAIM program subsumed. However, it appears that the regulators, using 
their discretionary power, systematically deviated from historical emissions when allocating the 
RECLAIM emission credits. Such deviations may not be all that surprising, as many pollution-
related industries have political influence sufficient to block policies that would harm their 
profits. Indeed, as discussed in Bovenberg et al. (2005, 2008), a politically realistic approach to 
environmental policy may require avoiding significant profit-losses to these industries.2 
The observed deviations in allocations of RECLAIM emission credits relative to the 
historical emission levels may not affect the overall control costs, and thus the efficiency, of the 
program. Montgomery (1972) proved that, in theory, the cost-effective allocation of control 
responsibility in a market based permit system is independent of the initial allocation of permits. 
In this case the trading mechanism guarantees that the overall costs of control of emissions are 
minimized. However, in the presence of certain market conditions, such as transaction costs, 
market power, or future price uncertainty, the independence of cost-effectiveness and initial 
allocation is not guaranteed (Hahn and Stavins, 2011). 
Stavins (1995) demonstrated that transaction costs can reduce trading levels and increase 
abatement costs. In the presence of certain transaction costs, equilibrium permit allocations and 
hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions, providing an efficiency 
justification for politicians′ typical focus on initial allocation. There is every indication that 
SCAQMD officials were aware that there would be significant transaction costs in the early 
phase of the RECLAIM program. In addition to the newness of the program, RECLAIM officials 
anticipated that uncertainties surrounding compliance needs and the lack of an effective 
brokerage service would lead to reduced trading activities (Prager et al., 1996; Cone, 1993). In 
an analysis of RECLAIM participants’ trading behaviors, Gangadharan (2000) found that in the 
early years of the program, transaction costs led to a 32% decrease in the likelihood that a 
RECLAIM firm would participate in the trading market. 
Similarly, there is increasing evidence that environmental justice groups have been 
effective in influencing their local environmental policy setting (Oates and Portney, 2003). 
Solomon and Lee (2000) note that pollution emissions trading systems continue to be criticized 
by environmental organizations for the creation of toxic hotspots. Yet, to date, there is very little 
empirical evidence of the magnitudes of the potential deviations of allocations of emission 
credits relative to historical emissions as well as the determinants of these deviations. This paper 
fills this important gap in the literature.  
                                                                                                                                                             
and Fowlie and Perloff (2008) have addressed the endogeneity of permit allocations with observed pollution emissions in cap and 
trade programs. 
2 Bovenberg et al. (2005) examine how the efficiency cost of emissions permits change when the program is designed to insulate 
profits. The relative increase in efficiency cost is sensitive to the extent of pollution abatement. As the required level of 
abatement increases, the costs associated with the abatement decrease, relative to the other efficiency costs of control. Bovenberg 
et al. (2008) show that when extensive pollution abatement is required, price-based instruments are more cost-effective than 
command and control policies because of their overall intrinsic abatement costs (i.e., higher economic efficiencies with regards to 
pollution abatement). 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the key determinants and distributional impacts 
of credit allocations in the RECLAIM program. We examine the deviation of allocation of 
emission credits in 1994, 2000, and 2003 from historical emission levels, and provide suggestive 
evidence of the factors that may have contributed to these deviations. Specifically, we focus on 
the following questions: Were regulators sensitive to environmental justice lobbies and did they 
use the RECLAIM program, at least in the short run when the expectation for emissions trading 
was low, to not only control emissions of NOX and SOX but also regulate toxics? Toxics, in 
particular their spatial concentration in hotspots and their disproportionate impact on minorities, 
have been a major concern of environmental lobbies (SCAQMD, 2000a; 2000b)3 and historically 
they have been harder to regulate, given the diversity of sources and their localized effects.4 In 
addition, we look at the impact of industry employment levels and size on the allocation of 
emission credits.5 
There is an extensive literature that examines how the behavior of governmental agencies 
is influenced by interest groups.6 In the context of environmental policy, for example, Cropper et 
al. (1992) find that regulators do take into account both special interests and general welfare 
when setting environmental standards for pesticide regulation. Sigman (2001) empirically 
explored bureaucratic priorities by studying the Superfund program. Her work provides little 
evidence that the EPA prioritizes sites according to their harms and suggests instead that 
concentrated private interests, such as liable parties and local communities, play an important 
role in the EPA’s priorities. More recently, Cook (2010) and Rabe (2010) analyze a number of 
proposed climate change-mitigating policy options in the United States, and identify the potential 
influence of powerful industrial lobbies (and their rent-seeking behaviors) as a detractor for cap 
and trade regulatory systems with auctioned emissions permits. Ellerman et al. (2007) and 
Raymond (2003) identify lobbying pressures and prior-use norms as factors that influence the 
design and structure of cap and trade systems. Raymond (2003) discusses the presence of both 
self-interest behaviors by legislators as well as equity norms in playing a role in the allocation of 
SO2 allowances under the Acid Rain Title of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Closely 
related to our study, Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) examine how Congress, influenced by the 
executive branch and various special interests, distributed SO2 allowances among electric 
utilities in the process of crafting acid rain legislation. 
                                                 
3 In some of our interviews with SCAQMD officials, it was pointed out to us that the agency made serious attempts to include 
some toxics in the design of the RECLAIM program, in part because the ultimate goal of the program was to reduce ozone. 
Because of the complications associated with regulating toxics directly, the agency opted to focus on NOX and SOX.  However, to 
the extent that emissions of NOX and SOX are corrected with toxics, by regulating NOX the agency hoped to indirectly address 
some of the toxics concerns as well. 
4 There is a well-developed theoretical literature on ambient market-based permit systems that would be capable of accounting 
for hotspots, beginning with Montgomery (1972). The difficulties associated with implementing an ambient permit system are 
thoroughly detailed in Tietenberg (2006). Atkinson and Lewis (1974) present a simulated sulfur oxide (SOX) ambient permit 
system that is cost-effective when compared to command and control systems, but to our knowledge no ambient permit-based 
system has ever been implemented. Chicago implemented a market-based system for volatile organic pollutants (VOCs), but 
simultaneously maintained its existing command and control system, to control for VOC hotspots (Kosobud et al., 2008). 
Kosobud et al., (2004) estimate that implementing an ambient permit system that also controls for hotspots could increase 
pollution control costs by 40 percent. 
5 For a detailed discussion of the interplay between jobs and the environment, see: Morgenstern et al. (2002) and Berman and Bui 
(2001). 
6 For excellent survey of the literature on the political economy of environmental regulation, see Stavins (2004). 
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While these studies have clearly advanced our understanding of the behavior of political 
institutions and the setting of environmental policies, several key features distinguish our work 
from previous literature. First, our work is the first to examine the behavior of a regional 
regulatory agency. This is important to the extent that locally-elected officials are likely to be 
held more accountable for their actions by the local residents that elected them and the local 
facilities they regulate.  
Second, the heterogeneity of facilities in this study is much greater than in Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1998), the prior study most closely related to ours. The heterogeneity of regulated 
facilities allows us to examine very important public policy questions, such as whether agencies 
systematically penalize facilities based on specific characteristics such as SIC or size. It also 
allows us to test whether identical facilities receive different treatments based on their spatial 
location, therefore highlighting the potential distributional costs associated with delegation of 
regulatory authority. 
 Third, because of the spatial features of our empirical strategy, we are able to ask 
whether a facility’s initial NOX allocation is influenced by its own emissions (of both NOX and 
Toxics) as well as the characteristics of neighboring facilities.  Similarly, we examine whether a 
facility’s location in a toxics hotspot affects the allocation of emission credits for that facility. 
None of these kinds of spatial considerations were central to previous literature on the political 
economy of environmental policy, yet spatial aspects are clearly central to the design of 
environmental policy. 
We combine data on the individual facility characteristics, historical emissions, and 
initial allocations of NOX credits to estimate spatial econometric models of the difference 
between emission credits allocation and historical emissions in 1994, 2000, and 2003. Our 
empirical results provide evidence that the employment to NOX emissions ratio and the toxics to 
NOX emissions ratio determine the deviations in NOX credit allocations. In addition, our 
empirical work also suggests that the coastal location of the facility and facility size impacts the 
deviations in credit allocations.  
When examining the factors that influence the deviations of NOX credit allocations over 
time, we note two important and somewhat intriguing results. First, it appears that regulators 
used the RECLAIM program to regulate toxics in the short run, when there were transactions 
costs present. In the absence of trade, these allocations are really just command and control 
regulations and indeed force facilities to reduce their toxic emissions. Over time, with the 
removal of the barriers to trade and the installation of abatement technologies, the regulating 
agency loses its ability to control toxics emissions and reduces its likelihood of preventing toxic 
hotspots. Second, we find that the regulator over-allocated NOX emission credits to electric 
utilities at the beginning of the program, relative to their historical emission levels. However, 
these same electric utilities are asked to contribute to their share of NOX reductions at later years 
of the program. These results are consistent with the findings of Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) 
that show that in the early years of the Acid Rain program, more sulfur dioxide emission credits 
were allocated to higher emission electric utilities, and that these same facilities were allocated 
fewer allowances in the later years of the program.7  
                                                 
7 Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) argue that the differences in allocations were designed to give the dirtier electric utilities more 
time to install costly abatement technologies. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a brief 
overview of the RECLAIM program; In Section 3 we introduce the data and discuss the 
empirical model; Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 offers some conclusions.  
2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RECLAIM PROGRAM 
In this section, we briefly describe two key features of the RECLAIM program relevant 
to our work: the design of the program itself, and the rule that justified the allocation of 
RECLAIM trading credits (RTCs) for NOX. 
2.1 The South Coast Air Quality Management District and the RECLAIM Program 
The greater Los Angeles area has a long history of poor air quality and of using 
innovative approaches to improve air quality. The primary contributor to the poor air quality in 
the greater Los Angeles area is ozone pollution. Ozone is produced when gaseous precursors –
NOX and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)—react in the presence of sunlight. As a 
pollutant, elevated levels of ozone have been shown to cause lung damage, chronic lung disease, 
and respiratory infections (Peters et al., 1999). Over the 1989 to 1993 timeframe the counties in 
the greater Los Angeles area experienced the most extreme violations of air quality standards in 
the nation: the Federal one-hour standard for ozone was violated for an average of 137 days per 
year, the Federal eight-hour standard was violated for an average of 171 days per year, and the 
Los Angeles area had an average of 41 stage-one ozone episodes per year8 (SCAQMD, 2006). 
In 1977, the air pollution control districts in the four counties in the greater Los Angeles 
area united to form the SCAQMD. The SCAQMD, which includes all of Orange County and the 
majority portions of Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties, is responsible for 
implementing and enforcing air pollution regulations across all of the stationary sources in the 
four-county area. The SCAQMD currently monitors over 30,000 facilities, in an area of 
approximately 11,000 square miles, with a population of over 16 million people (USEPA, 2006; 
SCAQMD, 2008). 
In October of 1993 the SCAQMD implemented the RECLAIM program, a cap and trade 
system designed to reduce the level smog-forming emissions in the SCAQMD by reducing the 
emissions of NOX and SOX. The RECLAIM program included the largest stationary emitters of 
NOX and SOX in the SCAQMD, and had a goal of reducing the total NOX emissions by 75% and 
the total SOX emissions by 60% between 1994 and 2003 (USEPA, 2006). Facilities in the 
SCAQMD were required to participate in the RECLAIM program if they had NOX or SOX 
emissions that were greater than four tons in 1990 or any subsequent year.9 In the design stages 
of the program, 390 facilities were targeted for inclusion in the NOX trading program, and 41 in 
the SOX trading program. At the beginning of the trading program in 1994, NOX RTCs were 
allocated to 374 facilities, and SOX RTCs were allocated to 40 facilities.  
                                                 
8 A stage-one episode occurs when the one hour ambient concentration of Ozone is greater than 0.20 ppm (or 167% of the 
Federal 1 hour standard). At this level, most will experience adverse health effects, including shortness of breath, and all sensitive 
populations, including the young and the elderly, are advised to stay indoors. 
9 Certain facilities with emissions greater than four tons were exempted from the RECLAIM program, including police and fire 
fighting facilities, hospitals, prisons, publicly-owned municipal waste-to-energy facilities, and all potable water delivery 
operations (SCAQMD, 1993b). 
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In the initial design of the RECLAIM program there was an attempt to include facilities 
that emit VOCs into the trading program. VOCs, many of which are regulated separately as air 
toxics, are organic gases that react with sunlight to form ozone. The major stationary sources of 
VOCs include dry cleaners, degreasing and coating operations, petroleum refining and oil and 
gas extraction. The SCAQMD intended to include an additional 2,000 VOC emitting facilities in 
its RECLAIM trading framework (USEPA, 2001). Due to difficulties in calculating VOC 
emissions, the hetereogeneity of VOC sources, and resistance from industry, the SCAQMD 
removed the VOCs from the trading framework before the program was adopted10 (USEPA 
2001). 
SCAQMD regulators were also concerned with the potential employment impacts of the 
RECLAIM program. California state law required a socioeconomic analysis of any new air 
quality rules, and the California Health and Safety Code (1993) mandated that any new air 
quality rules must not produce a greater loss of jobs than the command and control rules that 
they subsume. According to a review of the policy alternatives considered for the RECLAIM 
program, the projected job losses attributed to the RECLAIM program were negative in the first 
three years of the program, and were projected to be less than 4 hundredths of a percent of the 
total employment base in the SCAQMD by 1999 (Johnson and Pekelney, 1996). In a later study, 
Berman and Bui (2001) found that there were almost no employment effects in the SCAQMD 
due to environmental regulations.11  
Each facility that participated in the RECLAIM program was designated as either an 
“inland” or a “coastal” facility, depending on its location. In general, the more severe ambient air 
quality conditions occur in the inland areas of the SCAQMD, and the most prevalent direction of 
atmospheric pollution transport is from the coastal to the inland areas. By restricting the trade of 
credits from inland facilities to coastal facilities, the Inland/Coastal designation limits the 
transfer of emissions from the downwind locations to the upwind locations.12 
2.2 Initial Allocation of RECLAIM Trading Credits 
At the outset of the RECLAIM program, each facility in the program was allocated a 
unique volume of RTCs, measured in pounds of NOX or SOX, for each of the 1994 through 2010 
compliance years. Therefore, as of 1994, each RECLAIM facility knew exactly how many RTCs 
they would be allocated for each year of the program. The aggregate RTC cap for the facilities 
that participated in the program was designed to decrease from 36,781 tons of NOX in 1994 to 
9,216 tons (a 75% reduction) in 2003, and to remain constant from 2003 on. This reduction was 
consistent with the air quality standards that the RECLAIM cap and trade system subsumed 
(USEPA, 1995). In order to assure that future emissions goals would be met, any new facilities 
                                                 
10 In the years that followed the implementation of the RECLAIM program, several proposals related to regulating VOCs with a 
cap and trade system were brought before the SCAQMD Governing Board, none of which were ever implemented (EPA, 2001). 
11 Berman and Bui (2001) attribute the lack of an employment effect to three potential causes: the regulations apply 
disproportionately to the capital-intensive plants that have low employment levels; the plants primarily sell to local markets 
where their competitors face the same environmental regulations; and the increased need for abatement complements 
employment. 
12 Of the 374 facilities in the RECLAIM NOX RTC program in 1994, approximately 72% (269) were located in the Coastal zone. 
Under the Coastal/Inland classification, Coastal facilities could only acquire NOX or SOX RTCs from other Coastal facilities, 
whereas Inland facilities could acquire RTCs from either Coastal or Inland facilities (Johnson and Pekelney, 1996). 
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that entered the SCAQMD that were also subject to the RECLAIM program were required to 
purchase RTCs from existing RECLAIM facilities. 
The RECLAIM program was designed such that RTCs could be traded to other facilities 
within the RECLAIM program, but were only valid for the compliance year and cycle for which 
they were assigned—no banking of RTCs was allowed. RTCs were assigned to one of two 
twelve-month staggered cycles in order to avoid problems with price volatility that might occur 
at the very end of an annual compliance period (Johnson and Pekelney, 1996). RECLAIM 
facilities were allowed to trade future RTCs, but these futures could only be used in the 
year/cycle for which they were initially assigned. 
At the beginning of the RECLAIM program, a key issue addressed by the SCAQMD was 
the definition of the rule that would determine the volume of RTCs allocated to the different 
facilities (Johnson and Pekelney, 1996). The methodology used by the SCAQMD to allocate 
RTCs is set out in Rule 2002 of the SCAQMD. RTCs were grandfathered to the RECLAIM 
facilities based on their historical throughput (fuel use), emission factors, prior credits and 
offsets.13 Because there was some historical variability in emissions levels, the throughput year 
that was used for each facility was based on the maximum emissions year from 1989 to 1992. 
The 1989 to 1992 period was chosen in order to arrive at an initial allocation that would reflect a 
recession-neutral baseline year (Prager et al., 1996).  
The fuel value for each RECLAIM facility was then multiplied by technology-specific 
emissions factors (EMSs) to arrive at a NOX or SOX RTC allocation, measured in pounds. The 
EMSs for each facility vary depending on the technology that that facility has installed and were 
based on existing regulations and the “reasonably available control technology” rules that the 
RECLAIM program subsumed (USEPA, 1995). For each technology, starting and ending EMSs 
were determined by the SCAQMD; Rule 2002 specifies that approximately 203 different EMSs 
were used to determine the 1994 RTC allocation, over 65% of which were based on proprietary 
values reported by the individual facilities (SCAQMD, 1993a). The use of EMSs to assign RTCs 
is convenient because many of the facilities in the RECLAIM program don’t have continuous 
emissions monitoring equipment installed.14 Therefore, the past, current and future emissions 
levels are estimates, based on the technology and volume of fuel that the facility uses.  
The 1994, 2000, and 2003 allocation years are particularly important for our analysis. 
The 1994 allocation is not only the starting RTC allocation for each facility, but it also reflects 
the severity of the abatement that each facility must make relative to their historical emissions 
levels. SCAQMD officials anticipated that the RECLAIM trading market would be slow in the 
initial years of the program (Prager et al., 1996; Cone, 1993). In the first year of the RECLAIM 
program, only 45 NOX RTC trades were completed—including trades for future RTCs. The 
SCAQMD (1998) indicates that these 45 trades accounted for 2,210 tons of NOX RTCs. If high 
transactions costs existed in the RECLAIM trading market during the first few years of the 
program, then the initial allocations of RTCs could potentially disadvantage those facilities that 
                                                 
13 The RTCs were allocated at zero-cost to the RECLAIM facilities. 
14 The cost of installing and maintaining continuous emission monitoring equipment is high, and the SCAQMD mandates that 
only the largest NOX and SOX emitters have continuous emissions monitors installed and certified. As of 1996, only 86 facilities 
in the SCAQMD had continuous emissions monitors in place (SCAQMD, 1998). 
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needed access to additional RTCs. In the absence of available RTCs, those facilities in need 
would be forced to violate the rules of the program, alter their production processes, or move 
their polluting activities outside of the SCAQMD.15  
Like the 1994 NOX RTC allocation year, the 2000 NOX RTCs allocation year was 
calculated using a similar process to the 1994 allocation year: Facility-specific, technology-based 
EMSs were multiplied by the historical throughput values.16 The year 2000 RTC allocation, once 
determined, also defined the 1995 through 1999 year RTC allocations, since the allocation for 
each of these years was a facility-specific, straight-line depreciation between the 1994 year 
allocation and the 2000 year allocation. The significance of the 2000 NOX RTC allocation is 
again rooted in the potential for discretionary regulatory power. Not only does it provide the 
regulator with a second opportunity to penalize certain firms in the allocation of RTCs, but it 
also provides the regulator with the ability to reward the firms that received a more severe initial 
1994 RTC allocation with a more lenient follow-up depreciation schedule. 
The 2003 RTC allocation is included because it reflects the total pollution reduction that 
the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program will generate. The year 2001, 2002, and 2003 NOX RTC 
allocation levels are facility-specific, but they decline at a constant rate (from the 2000 RTC 
allocation) for all facilities.17 
3. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
To implement our analysis, we combine facility-level data on historical NOX emissions, 
the allocation of NOX RTCs for the 1994, 2000 and 2003 emission years, and industry and 
facility characteristics. This section describes the data sources, presents summary statistics on the 
different industrial groups in the RECLAIM program, and presents the empirical model.  
3.1 RECLAIM Trading Credits  
The RECLAIM Trading Credit data were obtained directly from the SCAQMD through a 
public records request. The NOX RTC database includes the yearly allocations, RTC trades, 
retirement of RTCs, as well as any adjustments to the annual allocations for every facility that 
participates in the RECLAIM program. For each facility in the RECLAIM program, we were 
able to obtain from this database the location of the facility, the SIC category of the facility, as 
well as the 1994, 2000, and 2003 NOX RTC allocations, all assigned prior to the start date of the 
program.18 The four-digit SIC assigned to each facility was further reduced to a two-digit SIC 
code, representing the “major” industrial segments, per the United States Economic Census. The 
location of the facility indicates whether it falls in the Coastal or Inland trading zone. 
                                                 
15 On average, facilities in the RECLAIM NOX trading market were allocated more RTCs at the start of the program than were 
used. (EPA, 2006) The fact that NOX RTCs could not be banked, yet trading activity levels were low for both completed trades 
and sell offers, is indicative of the ineffectiveness of the trading market in the early years of the RECLAIM program.  
16 The 2000 RTC credit allocations were based on EMSs that determined the “technologically feasible abatement volume” for 
each facility in the RECLAIM program (Schubert and Zerlauth, 1999). 
17 For example, the 1995 allocationi == 1994 allocationi - (1994 allocationi – 2000 allocationi)/six for each facility i, whereas the 
2001 allocationi == 2000 allocationi * X, where X is constant across all facilities (and is equal to ~ 0.91 for the 2001 allocation, 
and ~0.82 for the 2002 allocation). 
18 The SCAQMD reports the NOX RTC credit allocations in pounds, but for convenience and in order to coincide with the 
California Air Resources Board emissions inventory, we have converted these allocations to short tons (2000 lbs). 
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3.2 Additional Data: Historical NOX Emissions, Revenue, Employment, and Toxics 
Emissions 
We supplement the data on NOX RTC allocations with additional relevant data, reflecting 
the need to capture other determinants of the deviations in allocation. Since all of the fuel values 
and a majority of the technology-specific emissions factors that the SCAQMD used to assign 
NOX RTCs are proprietary, we rely on the facility-level reporting of NOX emissions from 
previous years to the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in order to determine the historical 
emissions. Historical NOX emissions data from the 1989-1993 compliance years were provided 
by CARB via a personal data request. Because the NOX RTCs were allocated based on the 
maximum throughput year from 1989 to 1992, inclusive, we use the high value over this time 
period as a measure of the historical emissions level of the RECLAIM facility (SCAQMD, 
1993a). 
The variation in the EMSs reflect the difference in abatement costs and abatement 
potential measured across the different facilities. As some facilities may have installed more 
effective (and costly) abatement technologies prior to the RECLAIM program, one would expect 
these facilities to receive more RTCs at the start of the program, since they had already made 
more aggressive technological improvements. However, because all of the throughput measures 
and a majority (65%+) of the EMSs are facility-specific and therefore not publicly available, we 
are unable to compare technologies across facilities. Instead, we can only observe the actual RTC 
allocations and how these allocations differ from the historical emission levels. In this case, it is 
possible that the determination of the EMSs, particularly those 65%+ that are facility-specific, 
could be politically motivated. 
In our models, we posit that the deviations between historical emissions and the 1994, 
2000, and 2003 NOX RTC allocations reflect the discretionary power of the SCAQMD, and 
therefore can be used to measure the distributional impacts of the program. In our empirical 
analysis, we focus not on the allocation itself, but on the deviation between the historical 
emissions of the facility and the allocation. In this way we are able to capture the distributional 
rents associated with the differences in allocations, and are able to abstract from the scale-based 
factors (such as the emissions size of the facility,) which may dominate a simple analysis of 
allocation.  
Given our measure of the distributional impact of the RECLAIM program, we are 
concerned with the facility-level factors that may have influenced the deviations in NOX RTC 
allocations to RECLAIM facilities. First, the impact of environmental regulations on 
employment is a serious concern of SCAQMD regulators. Prior to the start of the RECLAIM 
program, the claim that a cap and trade system would cause large job losses was made by several 
RECLAIM facilities, and was successfully defended by the SCAQMD (Superior Court of 
California, 1993). Because of the attention the SCAQMD regulators dedicated to employment 
impacts, we are interested in determining whether the employment level of a RECLAIM facility 
influenced the deviations in the NOX RTCs that it was allocated. 
Second, the ability of a facility to install technologies to rapidly reduce emissions may 
have influenced the deviations in the NOX RTCs allocated to that facility. Specifically, the size 
(measured in annual revenues), the profitability, or the debt/equity ratio of the facility or parent 
company may reflect that the facility is better able to afford the added cost of buying NOX credits 
through the RECLAIM trading market or support the cost of installing abatement technologies.  
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Because a large number of facilities in the RECLAIM program are subsidiaries of larger 
companies, and an even larger number are privately owned, facility-level employment and 
financial numbers and corporate profitability data are not made publicly available. For this 
reason we use state-level industry employment and revenue data from the Economic Census to 
assign employment and revenue values to each facility. Specifically, the 1997 Economic Census 
provides information on the sales revenue and number of employees for each industry in the 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) which is the successor to the SIC 
system. A mapping between the NAICS and the SIC system provided four-digit SIC-specific 
measures of employment and revenue for each four-digit SIC group in California. The aggregate 
1997 Economic Census data was then compared to 1997 CARB NOX totals, which were 
aggregated at the four-digit SIC level for all emitters in California. Together, the 1997 Economic 
Census data and the 1997 CARB NOX emissions data gave us the average 1997 employees per 
ton of NOX in California for each four-digit SIC, as well as the average 1997 revenue per ton of 
NOX in California for each four-digit SIC. The revenue per ton of NOX data was normalized 
using the 1993 price index for California, and was multiplied by the total NOX emissions in 
1993, recorded by CARB for each facility, to arrive at an estimate of the revenue per facility for 
1993. We recognize that our four-digit SIC measures of employment and revenue are second-
best approximations for the facility-level data. As a robustness check, we were able to acquire 
self-reported employment numbers for a subsample (N=107) of the RECLAIM facilities, directly 
from the SCAQMD. We use this data and present the results in Section 4.2.  
Finally, we are concerned with the impact that the facilities’ emissions of air toxics may 
have had on the deviations in NOX RTC allocations. Like NOX, air toxics can react in the 
atmosphere to produce ozone, and were initially considered for inclusion in the RECLAIM 
program (USEPA, 2001). In addition, air toxics have been a major concern of environmental 
lobbies in the SCAQMD—with regards to their spatial concentration and the formation of toxic 
hotspots (SCAQMD, 2000a; 2000b). In order to measure the toxics emissions of each 
RECLAIM facility, we collected the 1993 emissions of total organic gases (TOG) from CARB.19 
The 1993 TOG emission reported by CARB for each RECLAIM facility was then divided by the 
1993 NOX reported for each RECLAIM facility, to arrive at a measure of the tons of toxics per 
ton of NOX emitted in 1993. 
3.3 Trends in RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocations 
Table 1 presents summary information for the facilities included in our analysis. Column 
(1) shows the major two-digit SICs that were initially included in the RECLAIM program. The 
heterogeneity of industry types is considerable—ranging from traditionally low-polluting 
industries such as Engineering firms and Hotels, to higher-polluting industries such as Petroleum  
Refining and Electric, Gas, and Sanitary services. Column (2) presents the number of facilities in 
each two-digit SIC category. There were 36 major two-digit SICs that participated in the 
RECLAIM program in 1994. Of these 36 major two-digit SICs, over 83% of the facilities fell 
into one of the 12 largest two-digit SICs, and 13 of the two-digit SICs had two or fewer facilities 
in them. Column (3) displays the mean two-digit SIC historical NOX emissions. The largest 
historical polluters were the Oil and Gas Extraction facilities (SIC 13), the Petroleum Refineries 
                                                 
19 The total organic gases (TOG) measure provided by the California Air Resources Board includes both the reactive (VOCs) and 
non-reactive air toxics.  
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(SIC 29), the Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products facilities (SIC 32), and the Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary Services facilities (SIC 49). Together they represented approximately 86% of the 
total NOX RTCs allocated to the 374 RECLAIM facilities in 1994. In fact, on average, the 
historical emissions of the largest polluters in the RECLAIM program (Petroleum Refineries) are 
approximately two orders of magnitude larger than the smallest polluters (Miscellaneous  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 2-Digit SIC RECLAIM NOx RTCs and Historical Emissions











Oil and Gas Extraction (13) 31 174.7 87.9 16.9 12.5
Mining (14) 2 21.6 9.3 0.6 0.4
Heavy Construction (16) 1 24.5 24.5 1.6 1.2
Special Trade Contractors  (17) 3 12.7 15.6 2.8 2.0
Food Products (20) 29 22.0 8.0 6.0 4.4
Textiles (22) 19 15.3 6.8 5.2 3.8
Apparel (23) 1 7.2 3.9 2.8 2.1
Lumber and Wood Products (24) 1 19.3 19.3 1.3 0.9
Furniture and Fixtures (25) 1 13.0 9.3 4.5 3.2
Paper and Allied Products  (26) 16 109.4 80.7 30.0 21.8
Printing (27) 4 32.0 30.0 19.6 14.4
Chemicals and Allied Products (28) 22 36.8 25.3 19.6 14.3
Petroleum Refining (29) 37 517.0 324.7 129.4 93.8
Rubber and Plastics Products (30) 10 8.3 4.2 2.7 2.0
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products (32) 33 172.2 137.7 41.6 30.1
Primary Metal Industries  (33) 28 27.4 32.5 16.1 11.7
Fabricated Metal Products (34) 22 28.2 23.7 7.9 5.9
Industrial and Commercial Machinery (35) 6 11.7 6.1 4.4 3.2
Electronic Equipment (36) 6 10.2 7.5 4.7 3.5
Transportation Equipment  (37) 20 23.0 17.1 9.8 7.2
Instruments (38) 3 10.4 9.4 3.1 2.3
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  (39) 1 5.3 3.5 2.1 1.5
Motor Freight Transportation (42) 1 10.8 10.8 5.7 4.1
Transportation By Air  (45) 3 70.4 69.3 10.5 7.6
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas  (46) 1 9.9 3.7 3.6 2.6
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services  (49) 45 396.9 273.7 73.9 54.4
Wholesale Trade--Durable Goods  (50) 5 27.5 11.3 3.0 2.2
Wholesale Trade--Non-Durable Goods  (51) 4 7.8 3.4 3.2 2.3
Food Stores  (54) 4 6.8 4.6 2.9 2.1
Depository Institutions  (60) 2 24.6 22.5 11.1 8.0
Hotels (70) 3 16.2 17.1 3.1 2.2
Personal Services  (72) 5 9.7 6.1 2.7 2.0
Business Services (73) 1 54.3 53.6 53.4 38.7
Miscellaneous Repair Services  (76) 1 5.3 4.3 1.3 0.9
Amusement and Recreation Services (79) 2 129.0 135.8 109.1 79.0
Engineering and Management (87) 1 32.4 32.4 32.4 23.4
Total 374
Mean 146.7 98.3 33.8 24.6
Group Mean Values
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Manufacturing and Repair SICs). Because the Oil and Gas Extraction, Petroleum Refining, 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products facilities, and the Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
facilities represent such a large portion of the stationary NOX emissions in the SCAQMD, any 
effective programs to reduce NOX emissions must carefully address them. The complete removal 
of the other 228 facilities in the RECLAIM program would only remove 5,179 tons of NOX—
which represents approximately 19% of the targeted reduction between 1994 and 2003. Columns 
(4) through (6) present the mean NOX allocations, measured across the 1994, 2000, 2003 
allocation years, respectively. There are several points worth noting. First, there is considerable 
variability in the absolute difference between the historical emission level and the 1994, 2000, 
and 2003 allocation years when measured across two-digit SIC groups. The absolute difference 
between the historical emissions level and the 1994 allocation ranges from an increase of 6.8 
tons of NOX (Amusement and Recreation, SIC 79) to a decrease of 192.3 tons of NOX 
(Petroleum Refining, SIC 29). On average, measured across all industries, the 1994 NOX RTC 
allocation was -33% less than the historical emission level.  
Second, the industries that were more or less favorably allocated in the 1994 allocation 
year didn’t necessarily receive the same treatment in the 2000 or 2003 allocation years. The 
Fabricated Metal Products industry (SIC 34), which received a reduction of 16% between the 
historical high emissions level and the 1994 allocation year, received a much more severe 
reduction in the 2000 allocation year—a mean reduction of over 66% over that timeframe. The 
Food Products industry (SIC 20) on the other hand, which saw a large decrease in its mean 1994 
allocation of NOX (over 63% below the historical emission level,) was compensated in its 2000 
allocation of NOX, with a reduction of only 24% from the 1994 allocation level. 
 In summary, the data reveal a large hetereogeneity in allocations and deviations from the 
historical emission rule, across two-digit SICs. The goal of our empirical analysis will be to 
explain, systematically, the determinants of these variations. 
3.4 Econometric Model 
In this section we describe the econometric strategy used to measure the effects of 
industry-level and facility-level characteristics on deviations in NOX RTC allocations. In our 
empirical models, the dependent variable represents the change in allocation over three distinct 
periods: between the historical high emission level and the 1994 allocation; between the 1994 
and 2000 allocation years; and between the 1994 and 2003 allocation years. If we let  Di,t = 
RTCi,t - ei denote the change in allocation between the historical emission level or the 1994 
allocation (ei), and the NOX RTC allocation in year t (where t = 1994, 2000, 2003,) for facility i, 
then our basic econometric model is Equation (1): 
(1)        Di,t = β1 + β2Sizei + β3Empli + β4Toxicsi + ηi,t    
In the model described by Equation (1), Size represents the annual revenue of the facility, 
Empl represents the employment per ton of NOX, and Toxics measures the toxics emissions per 
ton of NOX. i,t is the idiosyncratic unobserved error component. We remind the reader that the 
allocation of NOX RTCs was determined prior to the start of the RECLAIM program for each of 
the 1994 through 2010 allocation years. For this reason, all of the explanatory variables that may 
have influenced the deviations in allocation are time-invariant across the 1994, 2000, and 2003 
years in our analysis. 
As noted in the discussion of the descriptive statistics, certain industries may be penalized 
because of their SIC. Of particular concern to RECLAIM administrators are the Petroleum 
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Refineries (SIC 29), and Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services facilities (SIC 49) because they are 
the largest polluters.20 These facilities also tend to be the older facilities in the SCAQMD, with 
older technologies, and therefore it may be more costly for them to abate. For this reason we 
include dummy variables for the refineries and electricity, gas and sanitary services producers 
within the RECLAIM program.21 
Conversations with air quality management district managers brought to our attention 
their concern for coastal NOX hotspots. By NOX hotspots, we refer to areas in which the 
concentrations of NOX are higher than in other areas in the SCAQMD.22 Because of the 
prevailing onshore direction of the winds in the SCAQMD, all facilities in the RECLAIM 
program are differentiated by the SCAQMD as being a “coastal” or an “inland” facility.23 We 
therefore include a variable in our analysis that captures the notion of coastal hotspot. For each 
coastal facility in the RECLAIM program the coastal NOX hotspot variable measures the sum of 
all 1994 NOX credits allocated to any RECLAIM facilities that are located within a three mile 
radius of one another.24 The addition of SIC dummies and coastal NOX hotspots results in 
Equation (2): 




dNOx + Ij + ηi,t    
where the notation is the same as that which was presented in Equation (1), but adds NOX which 
represents the sum of all NOX emissions within three miles (distance = d) of each facility, Ci as 
an indicator variable which equals one if the facility is located in the coastal zone, and j which is 
a vector of dummy variables for the Petroleum Refineries and Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services facilities. 
As was discussed in the introduction, different publicly elected officials may have 
different concerns for the facility attributes. As a robustness check, we interact each facility 
attribute with a dummy variable for each publicly elected representative. There are two 
exceptions: the SIC of the facility, and the coastal NOX hotspot. These regressors are given 
weights that are uniform across elected officials. The logic behind not interacting the SIC 
dummy variables with the representative dummy variables results from the fact that these  
facilities of concern are primarily located in Los Angeles County.25 The logic behind not 
interacting the coastal NOX hotspot with the representative dummy variables is that the presence 
                                                 
20 Together SICs 29 and 49 account for 24,333 tons (66%) of the 1994 NOX credits that were allocated to RECLAIM facilities. 
21 As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate all of our models with the full cohort of two -digit SIC indicator variables. The inclusion 
of these regressors does not impact the sign, magnitude or significance of our variables of concern. These sensitivity analyses are 
available upon request. 
22 Even though the primary concern for NOX emissions is their contribution to the formation of ozone, high concentrations of 
NOX can cause lung damage, chronic lung disease, and respiratory infections.  
23 The coastal/inland classification of facilities in the RECLAIM program was defined by the SCAQMD prior to the RECLAIM 
program, and was originally intended to prevent the creation of NOX hotspots. This classification limited the trading opportunities 
of the RECLAIM facilities: coastal facilities could only acquire NOX credits from other coastal facilities, whereas inland facilities 
could acquire NOX credits from either coastal or inland facilities. Of the 374 facilities in the RECLAIM program in 1994, 105 
(28%) were classified as “inland” facilities, and they were allocated 7,937 tons of NOX (approximately 22% of the total 1994 
allocation). 
24 The average NOX allocated within three miles of a RECLAIM facility in 1994 was 1,184 tons, with a maximum of 10,141 tons, 
and a minimum of 0 tons. 
25 26 of the 37 Petroleum Refining facilities (SIC 29), and 33 of the 45 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services facilities (SIC 49) in 
the RECLAIM program are located in Los Angeles County. 
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of a coastal NOX hotspot is a result of the emissions of nearby facilities—which isn’t limited by 
political boundaries. In other words, we have calculated the coastal NOX hotspots for all 
RECLAIM NOX emissions within three miles, regardless of representative. It is unlikely that an 
elected official will penalize a facility that contributes to a NOX hotspot only if it falls within 
their purview. In this case, it is the size of the hotspot as opposed to the location of the hotspot 
that matters. 
The coefficients and standard errors from Equation (2) could have been estimated using 
ordinary least squares. However, preliminary tests indicate that the error terms exhibit positive 
spatial autocorrelation.26 With spatial autocorrelation, the standard errors that we recover from 
ordinary least square methods are inaccurate.   
The literature uses two general approaches to correct for spatial autocorrelation. The first 
imposes a parametric structure on the spatial autocorrelation by using a weighting matrix to 
specify the correlation of the error terms. If the error structure is incorrectly specified, then the 
variance-covariance matrix is inconsistent. The second relies on a non-parametric approach that 
avoids the need to specify a weighting matrix, but rather uses weighted averages of the spatial 
autocovariance terms to correct the standard errors of the coefficients for possible spatial serial 
dependence (Conley, 1999). This nonparametric approach uses a generalized method of 
moments estimator that is just-identified, to arrive at coefficient results that are identical to the 
ordinary least squares point estimates, but provides consistent standard error estimates. We 
utilize the latter, and present the robust spatially corrected standard errors.27, 28 
4. RESULTS 
We begin our analysis of the empirical results by looking at the estimates of Equation (2) 
presented in Tables 2 and 4. We then present marginal effects for subsamples of the dataset, by 
facility size, presented in Table 5. 
4.1 What determines the deviations in NOX credit allocations? 
The effects of facility characteristics on the deviations in NOX credit allocations appear in 
Table 2. In this case, the least squares results and spatially corrected errors are consistent with 
our predictions—they indicate that the employment ratio, the toxics ratio, the coastal NOX 
hotspots, and the facility size all have statistically significant impacts on the deviations in NOX 
credit allocations in 1994.  
                                                 
26 The Moran’s I (0.199) and Geary’s C (0.930) statistics estimate a weighted correlation coefficient that can be used to detect for 
spatial patterns in the data. Moran’s I is the most commonly used specification test for spatial autocorrelation; Anselin (1988), 
and Cliff and Ord (1973) present the derivation of the Moran’s I statistic, and detailed explanations of the conditions that can lead 
to spatial autocorrelation of the error term.  
27 The Conley (1999) approach allows the researcher to specify a cutoff distance beyond which the spatial correlation is equal to 
zero. This approach is robust to any misspecification of the spatial dependence between the individual observations. We use the 
latitude and longitude of the individual facilities to define the cutoff distance, which is set at 0.1 degrees (or approximately 7 
miles). In this case the spatial correlation between facilities declines linearly as the distance between the facilities increases, and 
is zero beyond seven miles. 
28 daMatta et al. (2005) use the Conley (1999) correction for spatial autocorrelation to correct for interactions between cities and 
spillover of technologies in the determination of city growth in Brazil; Rappaport and Sachs (2001) use the Conley (1999) 
correction for spatial autocorrelation to correct for omitted geographic variables in their analysis of the impact of the proximity of 
cities to the coast on productivity and quality of life. 
 
BENTO, HENRY, & LOWE: CREDIT ALLOCATION IN A MARKET-BASED SYSTEM 65 
© Southern Regional Science Association 2013. 
 
Table 2: Least Squares Results of RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocation Change
Model: 1 2 3















Observations 374 374 374
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.60
Notes:  Huber-Eicker-White robust estimates of the standard errors with correction for spatial correlation 
(Bartlett Window of 0.1 Degrees)  are provided in brackets









Specifically, the size of the facility has a negative effect on the deviation in NOX credit 
allocations. A single standard-deviation increase in the revenue of a facility ($420M) translates 
into a 1994 allocation of NOX that is 124 tons less than the average historical emission level.29 
The employment to NOX ratio has a positive effect on the deviation in NOX credit allocations. A 
single standard-deviation increase in the employees per ton of NOX (103 employees) translates 
into a 1994 allocation of NOX that is 49 tons above the historical emission level. The toxics ratio 
has a negative effect on the deviation in NOX credit allocation. A single standard-deviation 
increase in the toxics per ton of NOX (31 tons) translates into a 1994 allocation of NOX that is 23 
tons below the historical emission level. And finally, facilities that are located in coastal NOX 
hotspots are underallocated relative to facilities that don’t fall in coastal NOX hotspots. A single 
standard-deviation increase in a coastal NOX hotspot (2243 tons of NOX) translates into an 
underallocation of 25 tons of NOX, relative to the historical emission level. Of the two industries 
of concern, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services Facilities, and Petroleum Refineries, only the 
Petroleum Refineries have a significant impact on the deviation in initial allocation from 
historical emissions—reducing the initial allocation by approximately 42 tons below the 
historical emission level. 
 
                                                 
29 It is possible that the size of the facility may, at least in part, be picking up the effects of the facility’s initial NOX emissions. 
Those facilities with higher NOX emissions may have higher revenues, since NOx emissions are used to impute revenue.  
Therefore those facilities with high NOX emissions might be asked to reduce their emissions more aggressively.  While we 
attribute this reduction to higher revenues, it may simply be due to unusually large NOX emissions. Unfortunately, due to data 
limitations we are unable to directly address this possibility, however we do account for the impact that the inclusion of the size 
of the facility may have on our other independent variables in our robustness checks in Section 4.2. 
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4.2 Robustness Checks 
Industry-level measures of employment and revenue are second-best approximations of 
the actual facility-level characteristics. Unfortunately, publicly-available facility-level 
employment and revenue data isn’t available for the facilities in our analysis. However, we were 
able to collect a smaller sample (N=107) of employment totals, provide by the SCAQMD 
through a records request, which has been extracted from a (optional) self-reported survey that 
was conducted by the SCAQMD at the beginning of the RECLAIM program. This smaller 
sample of employment statistics, although not a perfect match to our employment data, has a 
positive correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.61). 
As a robustness check to our base model (1) in Table 2, we present three sets of models 
in Table 3. Model (1) presents the baseline model (1) from Table 2. Model (2) drops the two 
variables of concern that were constructed by using four-digit SIC industry employment and 
revenue measures. Model (3) includes the new employment measure, constructed in the same 
way as the employment measure in model (1), but with the facility-level employment totals. 
Two points are worth noting. First, when we drop the variables of concern, the coefficient 
estimates presented in model (2) are consistent, in sign and significance, with those presented in 
model (1). The magnitudes of the observed coefficients are generally larger, likely picking up 
some of the positive correlation between employment, revenue and the pollutants that we are 
analyzing. Second, using a smaller subsample of the data with actual facility-level employment  
 
Table 3: Least Squares Results of RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocation Change
Dep Var: 1994-Historical
Model: 1 2 3

















Observations 374 374 107
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.20 0.37
Notes:  Huber-Eicker-White robust estimates of the standard errors with correction for spatial correlation 
(Bartlett  Window of 0.1 Degrees)  are provided in brackets
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measures results in coefficient estimates that are similar in sign (although, expectedly, not in 
magnitude) with those in model (1). In this model we lose the significance of the toxics ratio 
coefficient, and the magnitudes of the SIC dummy variables change (which may reflect the 
changing industrial composition of the subsample) but the general trends that we observe in our 
base model (1) persist. 
4.3 Do the factors that influence the deviations in NOX credit allocations vary over time? 
When looking at how the determinants of NOX credit allocations vary over time, we note 
two important and somewhat intriguing results from Table 3. First, it appears that regulators are 
using the RECLAIM program to regulate toxics in the short run (based on the deviation between 
the historical emissions level and the 1994 RTC allocation level,) when fewer trades take place. 
The coefficient on the deviation between historical emissions and the 1994 allocation level is 
significant at the 5% level, but the coefficients on the deviations between the 1994 and 2000 
allocations, and between the 1994 and 2003 allocations are not significant. There are several 
plausible explanations for this: First, the regulators may have been concerned about the direct 
impact of toxics emissions, and chose to reduce the 1994 RTC allocation to those facilities for 
which the toxics to NOX ratio is high. Second, in the same way that NOX reacts in the 
atmosphere to form ozone, certain toxics can contribute to the overall ozone problem. If the 
primary mission of the regulators is to reduce the emissions of ozone-causing air pollutants, then 
the facilities with large toxics to NOX ratios may be underallocated. Third, the toxics that are 
emitted by the RECLAIM facilities are exceptionally diverse, and the regulations that have been 
put in place to control toxics emissions are not as stringent as the NOX regulations.30 This makes 
it much harder to control the emissions of toxics directly, and all the more convenient to use the 
RECLAIM program to do so.  
Consistent with economic theory, the toxics to NOx ratio is only significant in explaining 
the deviations surrounding the 1994 NOX credit allocations. In the absence of trade, a market-
based credit system degrades to a simple command and control system and thus forces facilities 
to reduce their toxic emissions. Therefore, in the absence of trade, the initial NOX allocation 
allows the regulators to directly regulate toxics emissions. Over time, with increases in trade and 
the installation of abatement technologies, the regulators lose some of their ability to control 
toxics emissions and the resulting toxic hotspots. These expectations are reflected in our results. 
We find that the coefficients on the toxics to NOX variables are not significant in models (2) and 
(3) of Table 3 which look at NOX RTC allocations in the later time periods. 
The second intriguing result is that in these models, the Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services dummy variable isn’t significant in explaining the deviations between historical 
emissions levels and the 1994 NOX credit allocations. However, the Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services dummy variable is negative and becomes highly significant as we look at the later 
periods. These results are consistent with the findings of Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) who 
analyze credit allocations in the U.S. acid rain program. Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) show 
that in the early years of the program, more sulfur dioxide emission credits were allocated to the 
more highly emitting electric utilities, and that these same electric utilities were allocated fewer 
                                                 
30 Recall that in 1991, there were 181 separate air toxics emitted across 58,000 different emission sources within the SCAQMD. 
As of March 2000, the SCAQMD had eight local regulations in place (“airborne toxics control measures” (ATCMs))  to control 
for the stationary sources of air toxics within the SCAQMD. Most of these ATCMs rely on estimates of the cancer risk from 
exposure to air toxics as a justification for enforcement and regulation, which further complicates their regulatory efforts. 
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allowances in the later years of the program. The abatement technologies necessary to reduce 
emissions within the electric utility sector, including the installation of scrubbers and new burner 
units, are extremely costly.31 The short run leniency and long run strictness in NOX credit 
allocations can be viewed as a compensation or subsidization of these high costs. Our results 
suggest a similar pattern. 
Table 4: Least Squares Results of RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocation Change with County Representative Interactions
Model: 1 2 3

































Observations 374 374 374
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.60 0.61
Notes:  Huber-Eicker-White robust estimates of the standard errors with correction for spatial correlation 
(Bartlett Window of 0.1 Degrees)  are provided in brackets


















                                                 
31 In 2001 the upgrade (installation of new burners and abatement technologies) of a 450 megawatt electricity production facility 
in Orange County was estimated to have a capital cost of $130 million, with a total construction payroll of $45 million 
(California Energy Commission, 2001). 
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4.4 Do the different representatives share similar concerns? 
Table 4 presents the impacts of political representation on the deviations in allocation, 
and three important results stand out. First, for the deviation between 1994 and the historical 
emission level, the facility size variable is only significant in Orange County and Los Angeles 
County.32 The coefficient on the size of the facility is -0.284 in Los Angeles County, and -0.518 
in Orange County. As we expand the timeframe of the analysis and look at the deviations 
between 1994 and 2000, and between 1994 and 2003, the facility size variable becomes 
significant for both San Bernardino County and Riverside County. Both of the coefficients 
maintain the same (negative) sign and relative magnitude as those in Los Angeles County and 
Orange County, both of which remain significant. 
Second, the coefficient on the employment ratio of the facility is positive and significant 
for Los Angeles County and Orange County: the coefficient is 0.431 in Los Angeles County, and 
0.756 in Orange County.33  However, the coefficient on the employment ratio for the deviation 
between the 1994 allocation and the historical emission level is negative and significant for 
Riverside County. We are unable to reconcile the sign on the coefficient for Riverside County, 
but note that sign changes for models (2) and (3), and that the marginal effect remains very small 
(-2.5 tons). 
Third, the impact of toxics on the deviation between 1994 and the historical emission 
level is only significant for Los Angeles County and Riverside County. However, the coefficient 
for Riverside County has the perverse (positive) sign. The result for Los Angeles County is 
consistent with the SCAQMD’s Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study II (2000a) report that found 
that the areas with the highest toxics concentrations in the SCAQMD were in Los Angeles 
County. Again, we are unable to reconcile the sign on the coefficient for Riverside County, but 
note that the marginal effect remains very small (1.5 tons), and changes sign (and becomes 
significant) as we look at the future allocation periods in models (2) and (3).  
4.5 What is the impact of facility size on the deviations in the allocation of NOX credits? 
Facilities were grouped into three sizes, and the standard deviation for each group was 
calculated: small facilities with less than $10M in annual revenue, medium facilities with $10M 
to $50M in annual revenue, and large facilities with over $50M in revenue. Table 5 presents 
these calculations, using the county representative interactions from Table 4. 
The marginal effects presented in Table 5 show that a single standard-deviation increase 
in the revenue of a large facility in Los Angeles County ($641M) translates into a 1994 
allocation of NOX that is 182 tons less than the historical average emission level. Likewise, a one 
standard deviation increase in the revenue of a large facility in Orange County ($267M) 
translates into a 1994 allocation of NOX that is 228 tons less than the historical average emission 
level. The magnitudes of the effects are dominated by the larger (revenue > $50M) facilities in 
both representative areas. These results are consistent with the notion that larger facilities are 
                                                 
32 We remind the reader that the vast majority of the RECLAIM facilities are in these two counties: 250 (67%) are located in Los 
Angeles County, and 58 (16%) are in Orange County. 
33 Of interest is whether Los Angeles County and Orange County representatives place the same concerns on the facility size and 
employment ratio. T-tests suggest that the differences in coefficient outcomes are statistically different from zero, implying that 
different representatives do in fact put different weights on the size and employment ratio characteristics of firms. 
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more likely to be able to support the large fixed cost of the technologies installed to reduce 
emissions.  
Table 5 also presents the impact of employees per ton of NOX on deviations in the 
allocation of NOX credits. Again, the magnitudes of the effects are dominated by the larger 
facilities in both the Los Angeles County and Orange County areas—the marginal effect for a 
large facility in Los Angeles County is 62 tons (in comparison to 5 tons for medium facility, and  
 
Marginal Effects Period:
Size: small medium large small medium large small medium large
N: 128 126 120 128 126 120 128 126 120
Notes : The Effects represent the impact of a one standard deviation change for each regressor
(1994 - Historical)  (2000-1994)  (2003-1994)
















LAC Employment 3 7 89
-4 0 -1 -2 0 -1
78
LAC Toxics 4 7 5





OC Size -1 -5 -130
2 0 2 1 0 1
OC Employment 5 7 82








SBC Size -1 -5 -94






RC Employment 0 2 1 0
-9




RC Size 0 -2
0
SBC Employment 0
2 tons for a small facility) and the marginal effect for a large facility in Orange County is 96 tons 
(in comparison to 8 tons for a medium facility, and 5 tons for a small facility).  
Increasing the toxics per ton of NOX of a large facility in Los Angeles County by one 
standard deviation (26.4 tons toxics/ton NOX) results in a 1994 allocation of NOX that is 26 tons 
below the historical emission level. Of note here is the impact that the size of the facility has on 
the deviation in the NOX credit allocation: the effect of the large facilities is smaller than the 
effect of the medium facilities. Although the marginal effect is smaller for small firms (-21 tons 
NOX), it  is  largest for medium-sized  firms  (-33 tons NOX).    The size of  the facility  does  not  
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appear to be indicative of the toxic intensity of its production process.34 If a regulator is 
concerned with reducing toxics, then their greatest concern should be the toxics to NOX ratio, 
regardless of facility size.  
As was noted in the previous section, the marginal effects for the coefficients that had 
perverse signs are relatively small, when compared to those with the expected signs. Specifically, 
the marginal effects for the employees per ton of NOX (-2 tons NOX for the largest facilities) and 
the toxics per ton of NOX (~0 tons NOX for the largest facilities) in Riverside County are both a 
very small fraction of those presented for Los Angeles County and Orange County. 
4.6 What are the distributional impacts of the RECLAIM program? 
The deviations from the historical emissions rule translate into rent-based costs or 
benefits for the individual facilities: those that were allocated more credits than they needed were 
able to trade them on the open market for revenue, or were able to avoid the need to install costly 
abatement technologies in future periods; those that were allocated fewer NOX credits than they 
needed were forced to use the market to acquire credits, or to install abatement technologies to 
achieve compliance. These deviations between the historical emission levels and the 1994 
allocation allow us to analyze the cost implications of the program. There are four potential 
outcomes given that a facility is underallocated in terms of its NOX credits relative to its 
historical emissions level: First, the facility could install abatement equipment to meet their 
underallocation; second, the facility could use the NOX trading market to acquire additional 
permits; third, assuming that the NOX trading market isn’t functioning properly, they could 
continue with business-as-usual, and incur the backstop price per ton of NOX; and fourth, they 
could alter their production processes, thus reducing their emissions to the allocated level, or, as 
a worst-case outcome, they could halt production in the SCAQMD area altogether. 
Assessment of the costs associated with the installation of abatement technologies is 
impossible to determine without insight into the current technologies that the facility has 
installed, which is proprietary. However, we are able to provide estimates of the last three 
potential outcomes.35 The average NOX trading price in 1994 was $678 per ton. The total 
underallocation of 18,086 tons between the historical high emission level and the 1994 allocation 
level would result in a net rent transfer of $12.26M. The backstop price of $15k per ton, which 
was achieved during the 2000/2001 trading year, would result in a rent transfer of $271M over 
the same period. If the entire production processes in RECLAIM facilities were scaled back by 
the percentage of the underallocation, the total loss to the SCAQMD economy would be 
approximately $11.1B, measured as a fractional sum of the total industry-specific revenue per 
ton of NOX. The revenue for all RECLAIM facilities in the SCAQMD is measured at over $57B 
(all measured in $1993). 
In addition to the distribution of rents in the SCAQMD, the results of our empirical 
models presented in Table 4 indicate that political representation and the preferences of publicly 
elected officials have significant effects on the NOX allocations that facilities were granted. In 
                                                 
34 The Pearson correlation coefficient between toxics per ton of NOX and the revenue of the facility is weakly positive: 0.147. 
35 The SCAQMD has calculated the average RECLAIM Trading Credit price for the three years that we analyze: A total of 2,210 
tons of NOX RECLAIM Trading Credit were traded in 1994 for a total of $1.5M, or roughly $678/ton; 8,316 tons of NOX 
RECLAIM Trading Credits were traded in 2000 for a total of $177.2M, or $21,308/ton; a recent publication by the SCAQMD 
places a value of $3,759/ton for 2003 NOX Trading Credits. 
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Oil and Gas Extraction (13) Observations 22 8 1
1994 Allocation 83 113 4
2000 Allocation 15 25 0.3
2003 Allocation 11 19 0.2
Food Products (20) Observations 21 5 1 2
1994 Allocation 8 9 4 6
2000 Allocation 6 6 4 5
2003 Allocation 5 4 3 3
Textiles (22) Observations 16 3          
1994 Allocation 7 6          
2000 Allocation 5 5          
2003 Allocation 4 3          
Paper and Allied Products  (26) Observations 9 4 3
1994 Allocation 105 9 102
2000 Allocation 37 7 40
2003 Allocation 27 5 29
Chemicals and Allied Products (28) Observations 17 2 1 2
1994 Allocation 31 7 4 5
2000 Allocation 24 7 4 5
2003 Allocation 17 5 3 4
Petroleum Refining (29) Observations 26 6 2 3
1994 Allocation 401 254 12 13
2000 Allocation 164 82 7 7
2003 Allocation 119 60 5 5
Rubber and Plastics Products (30) Observations 2 5 2 1
1994 Allocation 6 3 4 5
2000 Allocation 3 2 4 1
2003 Allocation 2 2 3 1
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products (32) Observations 17 2 9 5
1994 Allocation 106 45 43 453
2000 Allocation 28 29 27 118
2003 Allocation 21 21 19 85
Primary Metal Industries  (33) Observations 18 4 6
1994 Allocation 15 12 99
2000 Allocation 7 7 48
2003 Allocation 5 5 35
Fabricated Metal Products (34) Observations 15 2 1 4
1994 Allocation 11 7 44 74
2000 Allocation 7 5 21 10
2003 Allocation 5 4 15 7
Transportation Equipment  (37) Observations 13 4 2 1
1994 Allocation 18 8 35 13
2000 Allocation 12 3 9 10
2003 Allocation 9 2 7 7
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services  (49) Observations 33 4 4 4
1994 Allocation 323 156 78 179
2000 Allocation 85 50 17 61
2003 Allocation 63 36 12 44
All Other SICs Observations 41 13 1 7
1994 Allocation 14 18 8 52
2000 Allocation 5 12 6 31
2003 Allocation 4 9 4 22
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order to demonstrate the potential costs or benefits associated with the location of a facility, we 
use the allocations that facilities were given in 1994, 2000, and 2003, and the average trading 
price of RECLAIM NOX credits during those years. This information allows us to determine the 
rents that were provided to facilities through the allocation mechanism. Comparing allocations, 
within industries, across representatives, allows us to determine the cost or benefit associated 
with a particular facility, and with a particular representative. 
Tables 7 and 8 use the average industry allocation information presented in Table 6 to 
determine the rent transfer associated with moving an “average” facility from one representative 
area to another. We’ve chosen two industries for this cost of distribution analysis: the Electric 
Gas and Sanitary Services (SIC 49) and Petroleum Refining (SIC 29). The inclusion of these two 
industry segments is self-explanatory—they were included as industry-fixed effects in our 
regression models, have been discussed in detail by the SCAQMD as being key industries for the 
program, and the facilities within each category are relatively homogeneous. 
In general, these tables verify that there are location-specific rents associated with the 
program, and that the rents are not uniform. In Table 7, a movement of an average Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary Services (SIC 49) facility from Los Angeles County to Orange County translates 
into a reduction in 167 tons of NOX in 1994, which is roughly equal to $113k. This same facility, 
if moved to Riverside County, would receive 246 fewer tons of NOX, or $167k.  Similar results 
are found for the Petroleum Refining Facilities (SIC 29) in Table 8, where we see that the 
movement of an average refinery from Los Angeles County to Orange County results in a rent 
loss of $99k, whereas the movement of an average refinery from Riverside County to Los 
Angeles County results in a positive rent of $263k. 
Over time, the NOX allocations and rents change as well. In 2000, the allocation to an 
average Electric Gas and Sanitary Services (SIC 49) facility in Los Angeles County resulted in a 
positive rent of $1.5M as compared to a similar facility in Riverside County. This location-
specific rent translates into 0.5% of the annual revenue of an average Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services facility in the dataset. Likewise, in the year 2000, the location-specific rent associated 
with a Petroleum Refining facility in Los Angeles County relative to one in San Bernardino 
County is $3.3M. This translates into 0.8% of an average Petroleum Refining facility’s annual 
revenue. 
Over time, the NOX allocations and rents change as well. In 2000, the allocation to an 
average Electric Gas and Sanitary Services (SIC 49) facility in Los Angeles County resulted in a 
positive rent of $1.5M as compared to a similar facility in Riverside County. This location-
specific rent translates into 0.5% of the annual revenue of an average Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Services facility in the dataset. Likewise, in the year 2000, the location-specific rent associated 
with a Petroleum Refining facility in Los Angeles County relative to one in San Bernardino 
County is $3.3M. This translates into 0.8% of an average Petroleum Refining facility’s annual 
revenue. 
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LAC OC RC SBC
0 -167 -246 -144
$0 ($113,315) ($166,586) ($97,919)
167 0 -79 23
$113,315 $0 ($53,271) $15,396
246 79 0 101
$166,586 $53,271 $0 $68,666
144 -23 -101 0
$97,919 ($15,396) ($68,666) $0
2000
LAC OC RC SBC
0 -35 -68 -24
$0 ($748,453) ($1,456,476) ($508,898)
35 0 -33 11
$748,453 $0 ($708,022) $239,555
68 33 0 44
$1,456,476 $708,022 $0 $947,577
24 -11 -44 0
$508,898 ($239,555) ($947,577) $0
2003
LAC OC RC SBC
0 -27 -51 -18
$0 ($99,974) ($190,446) ($69,364)
27 0 -24 8
$99,974 $0 ($90,472) $30,610
51 24 0 32
$190,446 $90,472 $0 $121,082
18 -8 -32 0
$69,364 ($30,610) ($121,082) $0
Table 7: Location-specific NOx RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocaitons and Rents for the Electric, 
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1994
LAC OC RC SBC
0 -146 -389 -388
$0 ($99,272) ($263,460) ($262,734)
146 0 -242 -241
$99,272 $0 ($164,188) ($163,461)
389 242 0 1
$263,460 $164,188 $0 $726
388 241 -1 0
$262,734 $163,461 ($726) $0
2000
LAC OC RC SBC
0 -82 -157 -157
$0 ($1,737,547) ($3,344,834) ($3,349,333)
82 0 -75 -76
$1,737,547 $0 ($1,607,287) ($1,611,787)
157 75 0 -0.2
$3,344,834 $1,607,287 $0 ($4,500)
157 76 0.2 0
$3,349,333 $1,611,787 $4,500 $0
2003
LAC OC RC SBC
0 -59 -114 -114
$0 ($222,513) ($427,891) ($428,468)
59 0 -55 -55
$222,513 $0 ($205,377) ($205,954)
114 55 0 -0.2
$427,891 $205,377 $0 ($577)
114 55 0.2 0
$428,468 $205,954 $577 $0
Table 8: Location-specific NOx RECLAIM Trading Credit Allocaitons and Rents for the Petroleum 
























This paper examined the factors that may influence the allocation of tradable NOX credits 
and its deviations from historical emissions under the RECLAIM program. Our empirical results 
confirm that the employment to NOX ratio, and the size of the firm impact the deviations in NOX 
credit allocations between the historical emissions levels and the 1994, 2000, and 2003 allocation 
levels, and that the toxics to NOX ratio impacts the deviations in NOx credit allocations between 
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the historical emissions level and the 1994 allocation level. In addition, our empirical work 
suggests that the location of the facility impacts the deviations in credit allocations. 
The spatially disaggregate nature of our analysis allows us to consider the potential for 
hot spots of NOX and toxics that may emerge as a result of the geographical concentration of 
facilities. A surprising finding is that regulators used the RECLAIM program—which was 
designed to regulate NOX and SOX—to also regulate toxics, perhaps in response to pressure from 
environmental justice lobbies or simply the inability to regulate toxics directly. This is 
remarkable because in the absence of trade, a cap and trade framework degrades to a simple 
command-and-control regime, and therefore, at least in the initial years of the RECLAIM 
program, it appears that regulators may have indeed succeeded in reducing toxic hotspots. Not 
surprisingly, over time, with increased trade and the installation of abatement technologies, the 
regulator loses their ability to influence toxic emissions through the credit allocation rule. One of 
the significant implications of this outcome is in the design of market-based cap and trade 
systems that involve the delegation of management and oversight to local, publicly-elected 
officials. Specifically, the benefits of having a regulatory body that is in much closer proximity 
to the regulated industries may also result in outcomes that are contrary to the mission of the 
regulation itself. In the case of the RECLAIM program we find the potential for the regulation of 
pollutants that aren’t identified in the legislation itself. 
We also find that, at least in the initial years of the program, regulators protected specific 
industrial groups within the SCAQMD. This result reinforces the findings of the acid rain 
program by Joskow and Schmalensee (1998), where the authors also found that the electricity 
industry was initially protected given the extremely high costs of installation of scrubbers and 
new burners.  
At first glance, the total deviation in credit allocations between the historical emission 
level and the 1994 allocation level may appear to be small when compared to the total pollution 
emissions within the SCAQMD.36 However, the NOX credit backstop price which was set at 
$15k/ NOX-ton at the outset of the RELCAIM program, and was reached during the California 
electricity crisis of 2000-2001, would translate into a net welfare transfer of $271M.37 The 
average per-facility underallocation of NOX credits is small when compared to some of the 
emission levels of the larger companies in the SCAQMD, but is sizeable for many of the smaller 
polluting firms in the SCAQMD. On average, the deviation between the historical emission level 
and the 1994 allocation was 48.4 tons of NOX credits per facility. At the backstop price of $15k/ 
NOX-ton, this translates into just over $725k per firm. Therefore the deviations from the 
historical rule that are introduced by the local regulatory agency have the potential of resulting in 
significant revenue reallocations. 
It would be inadvisable to interpret our results without some notable caveats. Although a 
firm-level analysis is most desirable in attempting to disentangle the discretionary influences that 
regulators may exert on individual firms, there is a paucity of firm-level data, and thus we were 
forced to make some assumptions on our employment and revenue estimates. The program itself 
does encompass the largest polluting facilities in the area—facilities that likely represent a 
                                                 
36 The total deviation between the historical emission level and the 1994 allocation level was approximately 18,086 tons of NOX 
credits. The total NOX credit allocation in 1994 was 36,781 tons of NOX credits. 
37 The $15k/NOX-ton backstop price was established in SCAQMD rule 2015—Backstop Provisions. 
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majority of the emissions attributable to those SIC categories that they represent. In this case one 
might argue, as we have, that it is reasonable to assume that state level (four-digit) SIC 
employment and revenue averages are reflective of those same industries in the SCAQMD. 
Nevertheless, assumptions have still been made. 
Similarly, the employment and revenue effects of firm-level influences should not be 
expected to end at the sociopolitical borders of the SCAQMD. Regulatory impacts to large 
corporations in the SCAQMD will impact employment and revenue measures across the state as 
the non-SCAQMD subsidiaries that are physically located outside of the SCAQMD will be 
impacted. In this case, the use of facility-only data may underestimate the true employment and 
fiscal impacts of regulatory decision making, and therefore region- or state-level average 
employment and revenue figures may be more reflective of the true economy-wide impacts of 
regulatory discretionary power. Regardless, we feel that this is a first step toward better 
understanding the potential impacts that including discretionary power in market-based permit 
systems may introduce. 
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